

DIARY NOTES


DD/S



14 November 1963

1. At the Executive Committee Meeting this morning:

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b. I reported briefly to the Director on Bob Bannerman's conversation with [REDACTED] about security clearances, including polygraphs, for Army personnel on duty at NPIC. The Director was displeased that [REDACTED] had not seen his 11 October memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this subject and said that the personnel assigned to ^{NPIC} ~~DA~~ were our responsibility and would be security cleared and polygraphed by us forthwith. Anyone who declines to comply will be sent back to the Pentagon. Insofar as the service detachments physically located at [REDACTED] but not an integral part of NPIC were concerned, he said that this was a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense but if any of the services failed to comply with his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, he would appeal it to the Secretary. He requested that John Bross and I get together to make sure this program was moving along. This we did with Bob Bannerman later in the day, and I am sure that the program is moving satisfactorily. It might be worthwhile to recap here the actual situation, which is as follows: There are three kinds of military people at NPIC: (1) Those assigned to the Agency--these people are security cleared and polygraphed by us in the same way that we clear and polygraph our own employees; (2) Department of Defense personnel who are assigned to NPIC but who are not formally assigned to the Agency and are not on our rolls. These personnel have not heretofore been security cleared or polygraphed by us, and it is this group that the Director insisted must be so handled or vacate the premises; (3) Army or other service detachments physically located at Building [REDACTED] but not an integral part of NPIC. This is the group which the Director said is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, but unless they are processed in the same way he will take the matter up with Mr. McNamara again. The weakness in not treating this group in exactly the same manner as any other is the fact that they have the same kind of identification cards and no physical restrictions whatever as to where they can go in the building.

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asked him to do or to refrain from doing anything we asked him not to do, provided I would let him know in about fifty minutes. I checked with General Carter, Ray Cline, [REDACTED] and Larry Houston, after which I tele- 25X1A9a
phoned [REDACTED] and said that time and telephone being what they were, we would not ask him to do anything specific but would be very interested in talking with him when he returns in early December.

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3. I spent several hours today discussing the [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
[REDACTED]. First Larry Houston, Jim Garrison, [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
[REDACTED] and our covert contact met, and later Larry, [REDACTED], 25X1A9a
[REDACTED] discussed the problem. We finally
agreed to make a payment of about \$9,000 on two of the three contracts, to
give simultaneous notification to the company that all contracts were can-
celled, and to select someone from the Office of Logistics to negotiate a set-
tlement. (Attached is a copy of the telegram sent tonight by the cover com-
pany.)

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4. [REDACTED] brought a paper to me which he wanted me to concur
in immediately. It had to do with the question of whether the Agency should
get into the national interest intercept business. I declined to concur. Chuck
pressed for my immediate reaction so that he could pass it on to [REDACTED] H
in response to which I said that I was reluctant to see the Agency get into
this business because of budgetary and personnel ceiling problems with which
everyone was familiar. Secondly, if we are going to get into the program, I
would like to see the Agency run it and not become "dog robbers" for NSA.
Third, if the Agency is going to get into it and run it, I see no necessity for
any major reorganization within CIA such as the paper suggested.

LKW:jrf

NOTE: Extract of item 1 sent to D/S on 21 Nov 63.

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